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WILLIAM M. TARTIKOFF*
Perhaps no statute enacted by Congress in recent years has caused
as much concern to the financial community as the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).1 The Act, which prohibits
certain transactions involving fiduciaries, parties in interest and dis-
qualified persons of employee benefit plans, has particularly troubled
financial institutions. Within six months after the effective date of the
Act, representatives of various financial industries urged Congress to
amend substantially the Act's provisions relating to prohibited transac-
tions.2 The Act, however, has not provoked such a vocal response from
open-end management investment companies, commonly known as
mutual funds. The primary reason that mutual funds have not re-
sponded so heatedly is that ERISA insulates them from the prohibited
transaction problems confronting other segments of the financial com-
munity and has served to encourage plan investment in mutual fund
shares. This Article will discuss the special treatment that ERISA ac-
cords mutual fund organizations and the relevant administrative devel-
opments that have occurred since the passage of the Act.
Any analysis of this matter must begin with a description of the
detailed regulatory scheme imposed on mutual fund organizations by
the federal securities laws. This system of regulation led Congress to
accord special treatment to mutual funds under ERISA.
* Assistant Counsel of the Investment Company Institute, the national association of the
American mutual fund industry. The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent those of the Institute.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified
in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 31, 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited by session law sections of
ERISA];
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5038 [hereinafter cited as H.R. CONF. REP.].
1. ERISA §§ 1-4082.
2. See Oversight of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Hearings on Pub.
L. 93-406 Before the Subcomnm on Labor Standards of the House Conm on Education and Labor,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 440, 496, 669 (1975) (statements of Bernard F. Curry on behalf of the Ameri-
can Bankers Association, Mark N. Kaplan on behalf of the Securities Industry Association and
William C. Morton, Jr., on behalf of the Association for Advanced Life Underwriting).
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I. STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF MUTUAL FUND
ORGANIZATIONS
3
A mutual fund complex usually consists of three distinct entities:
the mutual fund, the investment adviser and the principal underwriter.
First, the mutual fund, usually in corporate form, sells its own shares to
the public and uses the proceeds to acquire securities that meet the
fund's particular investment objectives, for example, growth and in-
come. Second, the investment adviser, a separate entity, provides in-
vestment advice and other services to the mutual fund pursuant to a
written contract. Third, a principal underwriter, pursuant to a written
contract, usually arranges for the distribution of the fund's shares to the
public. Often the investment adviser and principal underwriter are the
same entity or are subject to common control. The principal under-
writers for most funds whose shares are sold with a sales charge ar-
range for public distribution through independent broker-dealers;
however, the shares of a few funds, including the largest, are sold by
salesmen employed by the principal underwriter. Funds without a
sales charge, commonly referred to as "no-load" funds, deal directly
with the public in the sale of their shares, although some no-load funds
technically sell their shares through principal underwriters.
Mutual funds are subject to extensive regulation under the federal
securities laws. In the words of a former chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commissidn (SEC), "No issuer of securities is subject to
more detailed regulation than mutual funds."4 Since most mutual
funds offer their shares to investors on an ongoing basis, the mutual
funds must continuously register such shares under the Securities Act
of 19331 and must provide current prospectuses to investors. Invest-
ment advisers to mutual funds must register with the SEC under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940,6 and principal underwriters must reg-
ister as broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1
Most significantly, mutual funds are subject to detailed substantive reg-
3. For a more detailed discussion, see HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, REPORT OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-
72 (1966).
4. Letter from SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr., to Senator John Sparkman (Nov. 4, 1974),
quoted in Freeman, Marketing Mutual Funds and Individual Life Insurance, 28 S.C.L. REv. 1, 77
(1976). Freeman summarized the situation in more colorful terms: "[T]he mutual fund industry
has been studied, criticized, litigated against, and force-fed legislative and regulatory cure-ails to a
fare-thee-well." Id
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
6. Id §§ 80b-I to -21.
7. Id §§ 78a-78kk.
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ulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940.8 That Act con-
tains numerous provisions designed to prevent self-dealing, maintain
the fund's independence and prevent the payment of excessive fees and
charges by the mutual fund and its shareholders. Sections 10, 15, 17
and 36 of the Act contain severalvery important provisions: section 10
requires a mutual fund to have independent directors;9 section 15 re-
lates to approval of the fund's advisory and underwriting contracts;' 0
section 17 prohibits certain affiliated transactions;" and section 36
deals with fiduciary duties.'2
II. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS UNDER ERISA
Section 406 of ERISA and parallel'section 4975(c)(1) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954 (the Code) set forth a laundry list of transac-
tions that are prohibited unless the transactions are exempted by
statute, covered by a statutory transitional provision or exempted ad-
ministratively by the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue
Service (the Agencies). 13 The laundry list of prohibited transactions
includes transactions between an employee benefit plan and a "party in
interest" or a "disqualified person."14 These two terms are broadly de-
fined to include any fiduciary, 5 employer, employee organization or
person providing services to the plan.16 The prohibited transactions be-
tween a plan and a party in interest or disqualified person include, inter
alia, sales, exchanges, furnishing of goods or services and transfers of
plan assets. 7 In addition, there are special prohibitions on self-dealing
8. Id §§ 80a-1 to -52.
9. Id § 80a-10.
10. Id § 80a-15.
11. Id § 80a-17.
12. Id § 80a-36.
13. See ERISA § 406; I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1). Under Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978,43 Fed.
Reg. 47,713 (1978) (effective Dec. 31, 1978), the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
rulings and exemptions under I.R.C. § 4975, with certain exceptions not relevant to this Article,
has been transferred to the Secretary of Labor.
14. ERISA § 406; I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1).
15. ERISA § 3(21)(A) and I.R.C. § 4975(e)(3) set forth a three-part definition of "fiduciary"
as a person who:
(A) exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting man-
agement of such [employee benefit] plan or exercises any authority or control respecting
management or disposition of its assets,
(B) renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has authority or responsi-
bility to do so, or
(C) has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the adminis-
tration of such plan.
16. ERISA § 3(14); I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2).
17. ERISA § 406; I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1).
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by fiduciaries. 8 The prohibited transaction provisions, combined with
the broad statutory definitions of party in interest, 9 disqualified per-
son20 and fiduciary,2" have presented many problems for all persons
connected with employee benefit plans, including employers, unions,
trustees, administrators, consultants and various funding media.
ERISA and the Code contain specific exemptive provisions relat-
ing to particular types of financial organizations including banks and
insurance companies. These statutory provisions are cast in terms of
"transactional exemptions": they permit a bank or insurance company
that is a party in interest or disqualified person with respect to a plan to
enter into otherwise prohibited transactions with the plan.22 The trans-
actional exemption approach offers to those financial institutions cov-
ered by the provisions the obvious advantage of explicit statutory
authorization for the enumerated activities. This approach, however,
poses the risk that activities that fail to conform precisely to the statu-
tory language may be deemed prohibited transactions. Moreover, the
listing of exempt transactions may threaten banks and insurance com-
panies with restriction of their overall scope of action by operation of
the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius: the enumeration of a
series of exempt transactions may imply that other transactions are pro-
hibited.
III. MUTUAL FUND PROVISIONS OF ERISA
ERISA's approach to mutual funds differs greatly from its ap-
proach to banks and insurance companies. Instead of presuming the
relationship of a party in interest or disqualified person and then ex-
empting certain transactions, ERISA decrees that the normal relation-
ship of. a mutual fund and an employee benefit plan, in which the
mutual fund merely serves as a funding vehicle for the plan, will pro-
tect the mutual fund, its investment adviser and its principal under-
writer from being defined as a fiduciary, party in interest or disqualified
person.23
18. ERISA § 406(b).
19. ERISA § 3(14).
20. I.R.C. § 4975(e)(2).
21. ERISA § 3(21); I.R.C. § 4975(e)(3).
22. For example, ERISA § 408(b)(6) and I.R.C. § 4975(d)(6) permit a bank that is a fiduciary
with respect to a plan to render an "anciliary" service to the plan in certain circumstances. Simi-
larly, ERISA § 408(b)(4)-(5) and I.R.C. § 4975(d)(4)-(5) permit a plan covering employees of a
bank or insurance company to invest under certain conditions in the deposits of such bank or the
insurance policies of such company. In specified circumstances, ERISA § 408(b)(8) and 1.1LC.
§ 4975(d)(8) permit a plan to purchase or sell interests in a pooled fund maintained by a bank or
insurance company.
23. ERISA §§ 3(21)(B), 401(b)(1). See text immediately following this note.
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This definitional approach derives from two statutory provisions.
Section 401(b)(1) of ERISA provides:
In the case of a plan which invests in any security issued by an
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act
of 1940, the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such se-
curity but shall not, solely by reason of such investment, be deemed
to include any assets of such investment company.2 4
Section 3(21)(B) of ERISA provides:
If any money or other property of an employee benefit plan is
invested in securities issued by an investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, such investment shall
not by itself cause such investment company or such investment
company's investment adviser or principal underwriter to be deemed
to be a fiduciary or a party in interest as those terms are defined in
this title, except insofar as such investment company or its invest-
ment adviser or principal underwriter acts in connection with an em-
ployee benefit plan covering employees of the investment company,
the investment adviser, or its principal underwriter.2"
The legislative history of ERISA indicates that Congress enacted these
provisions recognizing that mutual fund organizations are already sub-
ject to extensive fiduciary regulation under the federal securities laws.26
24. ERISA § 401(b)(1).
25. ERISA § 3(21)(B). I.R.C. § 4975(e)(8) contains similar language, but uses the term "dis-
qualified person" rather than ERISA's term "party in interest."
26. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. 296. The Report states:
Since mutual funds are regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940 and,
since (under the Internal Revenue Code) mutual funds must be broadly held, it is not
considered necessary to apply the fiduciary rules to mutual funds merely because plans
invest in their shares. Therefore, the substitute provides that the mere investment by a
plan in the shares of a mutual fund is not to be sufficient to cause the assets of the fund to
be considered the assets of the plan. (However, a plan's assets will include the shares of a
mutual fund held by the plan.)
The substitute also provides that a mutual fund is not to be considered a fiduciary or
a party-in-interest merely because a plan invests in its shares, except that the mutual
fund may be a fiduciary or party-in-interest if it acts in connection with a plan covering
the employees of the investment company, the investment adviser, or its principal under-
writer.
Id Earlier committee reports contained similar explanations. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON Fi-
NANCE, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN REFORM, S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1973), re-
printedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4890, 4986-87; SuBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2d Sass., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, PUB. L. No. 93-406, at 3306
(Comm. Print 1976).
The latter report states:
Also, in addition, the bill provides that an open-end mutual fund, the mutual fund's
investment advisers, and the mutual fund's principal underwriters are not to be consid-
ered as plan fiduciaries or parties in interest merely because an employee benefit trust
purchases shares in the mutual fund. Mutual funds are currently subject to substantial
restrictions on transactions with affiliated persons under the Investment Company Act of
1940, and also it appears that unintended results might occur (such as presenting [sic] a
trust from redeeming its mutual fund shares) if mutual funds were not excluded from
these definitions.
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These provisions of ERISA have insulated mutual funds from the
major problems of prohibited transactions that confront other invest-
ment media.27 Therefore, while representatives of other financial in-
dustries have requested remedial legislation in this area,28 the mutual
fund industry has not felt the need to request such legislation.
29
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE ExEMPTIONS
Although ERISA generally exempts mutual fund organizations
from classification as fiduciaries, parties in interest or disqualified per-
sons, the mutual fund industry has identified five situations that may
fall outside the scope of the statutory exemptions. The industry has,
therefore, filed five applications with the Agencies seeking class exemp-
tions.30 In some of the cases there was considerable doubt whether the
transaction in issue was in fact prohibited. Only one case posed any
risk of seriously disrupting ordinary dealings between mutual fund or-
ganizations and employee benefit plans. Yet, as the following sum-
mary indicates, the Agencies have granted all but one of the class
exemptions sought by the mutual fund industry.
A. A Mutual Fund Organization's Internal Plan.
It is common practice for a mutual fund complex to fund an em-
ployee benefit plan covering its own employees with shares of one or
more mutual funds within the complex. A principal reason for such
"in-house" funding is the desire to avoid possible conflicts of interest
that might arise if a mutual fund complex managed its employee bene-
fit plan separately from its publicly held mutual funds. The SEC has
therefore encouraged mutual funds to fund "in-house" plans with mu-
27. For example, the investment by a plan in a pooled investment fund maintained by a bank
or in a separate accountof an insurance company that is not a registered investment company
may cause the bank or insurance company to become a fiduciary and the assets of the fund or
account to become plan assets. See H.R. CONF. REP. 296. Each plan having an interest in the
pooled fund or separate account will have a wide number of parties in interest and disqualified
persons; the prohibited transaction provisions of ERISA and the Code may prohibit the bank or
insurance company from causing the pooled fund or account to enter into a transaction with any
of these persons. The Department of Labor issued a prohibited transaction exemption for the
insurance industry, 43 Fed. Reg. 59,915 (1978), and has proposed an exemption for the banking
industry. See 44 Fed. Reg. 44,290 (1979).
28. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
29. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 2, at 777 (statement of Investment Company Insti-
tute).
30. ERISA § 408(a) and I.R.C. § 4975(c)(2) permit the Agencies to grant administrative ex-
emptions on both individual and class bases. For a general discussion, see Mamorsky & Murphy,
What Every Fiduciar
, 
Should Know: Exemptions to the Prohibited Transactions Rules, PENSION
WORLD, Oct. 1978, at 58.
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tual fund shares.31 Because ERISA expressly excludes such arrange-
ments, 32 the Investment Company Institute sought an exemption from
the provision. In response, the Agencies promulgated Prohibited
Transaction Exemption 77-3,33 which permits the funding of an "in-
house" mutual fund plan with shares of the mutual fund so long as the
plan satisfies the following conditions: (1) the plan must not pay a sales
commission; (2) the plan must not pay a redemption fee other than to
the mutual fund itself; (3) the plan must not pay a separate investment
management fee, investment advisory fee or any similar fee; and (4) the
plan's relationship with the mutual fund complex must be on a basis no
less favorable to the plan than its relationship with other shareholders
of the fund.
B. Investment Advisers.
A large number of investment advisory firms render investment
advice both to mutual funds and to other clients, including a wide vari-
ety of employee benefit plans.34 Many of these firms often recommend
that a portion of a plan's assets be invested in one or more of these
mutual funds. This may be appropriate, for example, where the mutual
fund's portfolio consists of securities of smaller, more aggressive
growth companies or securities of foreign issuers that might not be ap-
propriate investments for the plan on an individualized basis. Simi-
larly, at times it may be appropriate for the plan to invest a portion of
its assets in shortzterm money market instruments, and it often may be
preferable for the plan to invest in a mutual fund that has a diversified
portfolio consisting of such instruments rather than to purchase the in-
struments on an individual basis. In order to avoid having the client
pay what would amount to a double advisory fee, the portion* of the
client's assets that is invested in the mutual fund is deducted from the
asset base on which the adviser computes its private advisory fee.
35
31. Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52 (1976), and Rule
22d-1 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22d-1 (1978), a mutual fund that is normally sold
with a sales charge may reduce or eliminate this charge in connection with sales to full-time em-
ployees of the mutual fund, to its investment adviser and principal underwriter and to employee
benefit plans covering such individuals. The SEC staff has issued an interpretive letter expanding
the coverage of this exemption. Investment Company Institute, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 80,671.
32. ERISA § 406(a), (b)(2). In contrast, as indicated in note 22 supra, ERISA expressly per-
mits "in-house" plans of banks and insurance companies to invest in deposits of the bank or
insurance policies written by the insurance company.
33. 1977-1 C.B. 360.
34. See Feinberg, Can Mutual Funds Make It as Pension Managers?, PENSION MANAGE-
MENT, Oct. 1978, at 143.
35. See SEC No-action letter, Wellington Management Co. (June 21, 1972).
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The practice of an investment adviser to an employee benefit plan
causing the plan to invest in a mutual fund managed by that adviser
may raise problems with regard to prohibited transactions.36 The in-
vestment adviser to the plan is clearly a fiduciary and hence is a party
in interest or disqualified person with respect to the plan. ERISA's spe-
cial mutual fund provisions do not change this result. While the plan's
purchase of shares of the mutual fund may not raise any prohibited
transaction problems (since the transaction is between the plan and the
mutual fund, which is not a party in interest or disqualified person), the
advisory fee arrangement arguably may involve a possible conflict of
interest on the part of the investment adviser-fiduciary. For example,
since the advisory fee paid by the mutual fund normally varies with the
size of the fund, it may be in the interest of the adviser to increase the
size of the mutual fund by causing the plan to invest in the fund.
In order to resolve this issue, a group of investment advisory firms
sought and obtained Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-4,37 which
permits this type of transaction, provided the following conditions are
met: (1) the plan must not pay a sales commission; (2) the plan must
not pay a redemption fee other than to the mutual fund itself; (3) the
plan must not pay an investment management fee, an investment advi-
sory fee or any similar fee with respect to plan assets invested in the
mutual fund; and (4) an independent fiduciary of the plan who has
received full information from the adviser must approve the arrange-
ment in advance.38
C. Master and Prototype Plans.
The Internal Revenue Service has promulgated procedures that
permit mutual funds to sponsor master and prototype corporate plans,
Keogh plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (I.R.A.s) whose
forms may be approved in advance by the Internal Revenue Service.39
36. In contrast, as indicated in note 22 supra, ERISA expressly permits a bank or insurance
company to invest the assets of a plan that it advises in a pooled fund maintained by the bank or
insurance company.
37. 1977-1 C.B. 362.
38. This exemption was the first in which the Agencies conditioned an administrative exemp-
tion on approval by an independent plan fiduciary. Subsequently the Agencies have followed this
approach in connection with other exemptions. See, e.g., Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-9,
1977-2 C.B. 428, discussed in text accompanying notes 55-56 infra. It is interesting to note that
this is also the approach followed in § 15(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-15(c) (1976), requiring approval of mutual fund investment advisory contracts by independ-
ent fund directors.
39. See Rev. Proc. 75-52, 1975-2 C.B. 592 (corporate); Rev. Proc. 75-51, 1975-2 C.B. 590
(Keogh); Rev. Proc. 75-6, 1975-1 C.B. 646 (I.R.A.). Master and prototype plans are designed to
permit smaller employers and other persons, e.g., participants in Individual Retirement Accounts,
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Discussions between the Investment Company Institute and staff offi-
cials of the Agencies evidenced concern that the sponsor of a master or
prototype plan might be considered to be a fiduciary, particularly since
the sponsor normally retains the power to amend the master or proto-
type plan.4° Therefore, the Investment Company Institute requested an
interpretation or, alternatively, a class exemption. 41 In response, the
Agencies issued Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-9,42 which per-
mits mutual fund sponsors of master and prototype plans to continue to
sell mutual fund shares to such plans and to redeem shares owned by
the plans, provided the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the trans-
action must be in the ordinary course of business; (2) the transaction
must be on terms at least as favorable to the plan as an arm's length
transaction with an unrelated party; and (3) the total consideration re-
ceived by the mutual fund's principal underwriter and the selling bro-
ker-dealer must not exceed reasonable compensation.
D. Non-Bank Trustees and Custodians.
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, the Code provided that only a
bank could serve as the trustee or custodian for Keogh plan funded
with mutual fund shares.43 This requirement did not present any oper-
ational difficulties when the Keogh legislation was enacted in 1962,
since at that time most mutual funds employed banks to serve as their
transfer agents and to perform necessary accounting and recordkeeping
relating to shareholder accounts. It was, therefore, logical for a Keogh
plan funded with mutual fund shares to retain the mutual fund's bank
transfer agent to serve as the plan's trustee or custodian. However,
over the last decade a large number of mutual fund organizations have
to establish plans on a simplified and economical basis through the adoption of a standard model
plan that has received IRS approval as to form.
40. This problem is not unique to mutual funds; it also affects other sponsors of master and
prototype plans, including banks and insurance companies. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 2,
at 684 (statement of M. John Lippman on behalf of the International Trust Corporation); Panel
Discussion, Special Problems of Insurance Companies, 31 Bus. LAW. 257, 264-67 (1975).
41. Subsequent to the filing of the Institute's submission, the Agencies issued the so-called
"multiple service regulations." 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2 (1978). The regulations appear to indi-
cate that if sponsors of master and prototype plans are merely parties in interest or disqualified
persons by reason of providing services to employee benefit plans, their activities will not be
barred by ERISA's prohibited transaction provisions. However, the regulations do not deal with
the case where the sponsor may be considered to be a fiduciary. But see IRS Private Letter Ruling
7837048, [19781 FED. TAXES Prv. LTR. RUL. (P-H) 13214(78), that stated that X, the sponsor of a
master Keogh plan, is a fiduciary with respect to the plan because it has reserved the right to
amend or terminate the plan and because it has the authority to appoint or remove the trustees.
42. 1977-2 C.B. 428; 44 Fed. Reg. 1479 (1979).
43. I.R.C. § 401(d), as added by the Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat. 809, effective for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1962.
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ceased using banks as their transfer agents. A number of these organi-
zations currently employ non-bank data processing companies wholly
unrelated to the fund complex. In other situations, the transfer agent's
function is performed by the mutual fund itself, or by the fund's invest-
ment adviser, principal underwriter or an affiliate thereof.
ERISA amended the Code to provide that entities other than
banks could serve as trustees or custodians for Keogh plans, I.R.A.s
and programs established under section 403(b)(7) of the Code.44 A
number of mutual fund organizations that perform their own transfer
agent work have expressed an interest in serving as non-bank trustees
or custodians for plans funded with shares of their mutual funds.
While at least one court has held that a nondiscretionary custodian is
not a fiduciary,45 the Agencies have not taken a formal position on this
matter. Therefore, the Investment Company Institute submitted a re-
quest for an interpretation or, alternatively, a class exemption. The
Department of Labor has not yet acted on this request, presumably due
to the fact that only a few mutual fund organizations are presently serv-
ing as trustees or custodians for plans funded with shares of their mu-
tual funds. However, the Agencies did modify Prohibited Transaction
Exemption 77-9 to permit sponsors of master and prototype plans to
serve also as nondiscretionary trustees and custodians.46
E. Broker-Dealers.
As noted above, many mutual fund organizations sell shares of
their mutual funds to investors through broker-dealers that are unaffli-
ated with the mutual fund complex. While ERISA contains special
statutory provisions for various types of financial institutions, including
mutual funds, banks and insurance companies, it is silent with respect
to activities performed by broker-dealers. 7 This omission did not con-
cern the mutual fund industry at the time ERISA was enacted, because
the industry believed that a broker-dealer recommending and selling
mutual fund shares to employee benefit plans would not be a classified
as a fiduciary. Section 3(21)(A) of ERISA and parallel section
4975(e)(3) of the Code define the term "fiduciary" to include a person
who "renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct
44. See ERISA §§ 1022(d)-(e), 2002(b).
45. Hibernia Bank v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 411 F. Supp. 478, 490. (N.D. Cal.
1976).
46. 44 Fed. Reg. 1479 (1979).
47. "The conferees did not grant a statutory exemption to brokers for this type of multiple
service because of the difficulty of establishing precise statutory standards for protecting against
potential abuses." H.R. CONF. REP. 309-10.
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or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such
plan."48 Commissions received by a broker-dealer on the sale of mu-
tual fund shares are fixed by the fund in its prospectus49 and do not
fluctuate with the amount of investment advice or other services the
broker-dealer renders to an investor purchasing shares of the mutual
fund. The industry therefore believed that a broker-dealer who recom-
mended and sold fund shares to a plan would not be a fiduciary, since
the broker-dealer was not compensated for investment advice.50 How-
ever, while the Agencies have not issued a formal regulation or inter-
pretation regarding this matter, they have indicated a contrary view.5
The failure of ERISA to exempt statutorily transactions by broker-
dealer fiduciaries led the broker-dealer industry to request and obtain
Prohibited Transaction Exemption 75-1.52 Part II of this class exemp-
tion permits a broker-dealer fiduciary to sell mutual fund shares to em-
ployee plans. This part was based to some extent on the existence of
regulations under the federal securities laws.53 However, the exemp-
tion expressly excludes the situation in which "a fiduciary with respect
to the plan is. .. a principal underwriter for, or affiliated with,' 54 the
mutual fund in question. Thus, the apparent effect of the exemption is
to exempt sales of mutual fund shares by broker-dealers that are unre-
lated to the mutual fund complex, but not to exempt sales by a mutual
fund organization's own sales force. This distinction has never been
officially explained by the Agencies, but apparently results from con-
cern that a salesman employed by a particular mutual fund organiza-
tion is likely to be less disinterested than a broker-dealer that sells
shares of mutual funds sponsored by organizations unrelated to the
48. ERISA § 3(21)(A); I.R.C. § 4975(e)(3).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1976).
50. This view was supported by § 202(11)(c) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(l 1)(c) (1976), which excludes from the definition of investment adviser "any bro-
ker or dealer whose performance of such [investment advisory] services is solely incidental to the
conduct of his businesses as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation there-
fore." Id
51. In announcing Labor Regulation § 2510.3-21, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (1978), the Depart-
ment of Labor declined to issue a definitive ruling on what constituted a fee or compensation for
the rendering of investment advice; it stated, however, that direct or indirect compensation
"should be deemed to include all fees or other compensation incident to the transaction in which
the investment advice.. . has been rendered or will be rendered. This may include, for example,
brokerage commissions, mutual fund sales commissions, and insurance sales commissions." 40
Fed. Reg. 50,842 (1975). For further discussion, see Groom & Mazaway, ERISA -Fiduciary Re-
s.ponsibility, U. So. CAL. L. CENTER TWENTY-EIGHTH TAX INsT. 982-84 (1976); Page, Fiduciary
Responsibility: Limitations on Fiduciary; Potential Liability Problems and Selecting a Fiduciary,
N.Y.U. THIRTY-FOURTH ANN. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1186-91 (1976).
52. 1975-2 C.B. 543. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 5963 (1979).





The exclusion of mutual fund direct sales forces from Prohibited
Transaction Exemption 75-1 led the Investment Company Institute and
a group of mutual fund organizations to seek further relief, which was
granted in Prohibited Transaction Exemption 77-9. 55 This class ex-
emption permits mutual fund direct sales forces to recommend and sell
mutual fund shares to employee benefit plans, provided the following
conditions are met: (1) the transaction must be in the ordinary course
of business; (2) the transaction must be on terms at least as favorable to
the plan as an arm's length transaction with a third party; (3) the total
consideration received must not exceed reasonable compensation; (4)
appropriate disclosure must be made to an independent plan fiduciary;
and (5) the independent fiduciary must give prior approval to the trans-
action. 6
V. PLAN INVESTMENT IN MUTUAL FUND SHARES
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, mutual funds were recognized as
a suitable investment vehicle for a wide variety of employee benefit
plans, notably plans maintained by small corporations and self-em-
ployed individuals .5  ERISA not only expressly expanded the type of
employee benefit plans that can be funded with mutual fund shares, 58
but, by imposing fiduciary duties on sponsors of employee benefit
plans, has encouraged investment in mutual funds since they provide
liquidity, professional management and diversification of assets.5 9 The
55. 1977-2 C.B. 428.
56. One of the requirements of the exemption as originally adopted was that an independent
plan fiduciary, following receipt of required disclosure material and prior to the execution of each
transaction, acknowledged in writing receipt of such information and approve the transaction on
behalf of the plan. See 43 Fed. Reg. 18,359, 55,005 (1978). This condition created interpretive
problems, since each purchase of mutual fund shares may be regarded as a separate transaction
requiring the independent plan fiduciary to approve the transaction and acknowledge receipt of
disclosure information on a continuous basis (that is, before every reinvested dividend). At the
Investment Company Institute's urging, the exemption was amended to completely delete the ac-
knowledgement requirement. In addition, the exemption was modified to provide that a mutual
fund direct sales force may generally presume from the failure of the independent fiduciary to
discontinue purchasing shares of the fund that such fiduciary has approved the transaction. See
44 Fed. Reg. 1479, 1483 (1979).
57. The original Keogh legislation enacted in 1962 expressly provided that mutual fund
shares could be used to fund Keogh plans held in custodial accounts. I.R.C. § 401(f). Mutual
funds are the largest funding medium for Keogh plans. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED-
ERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS AND KEOGH ACCOUNTS AT SE-
LECTED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS OF MARCH 31, 1976, at 2 (1976).
58. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 403(b)(7) (relating to plans of public school systems and certain chari-
table organizations).
59. See, e.g., Davies, Feeling Becomes Muualfor Small Pension Plans, Pensions & Invest-
ments, Jan. 30, 1978, at 28, col. 1; DeViney, Rebounding Mutual Funds Entice Pension Dollars,
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Investment Work Group of the ERISA Advisory Council has con-
cluded that "the purchase of... mutual fund shares... may provide
benefits similar to naming qualified professional investment managers
and may be particularly beneficial for smaller plans in meeting the pru-
dence and diversification standards of ERISA."
60
As discussed above,6' the normal relationship between a mutual
fund and an employee benefit plan that has invested in the fund will
not cause the mutual fund, its investment adviser or principal under-
writer to assume fiduciary status under ERISA. This has led some ob-
servers to speculate that sponsors of employee benefit plans,
particularly sponsors of larger plans, may be reluctant to invest in mu-
tual fund shares since this will not result in a spreading of fiduciary
responsibility.62 Under this theory, a sponsor should seek to limit his
fidicuiary liability by allocating or delegating his responsibility to an
investment manager.63
While the author is unaware of any cases in which this problem
has actually arisen, it should be noted that there are a number of ways
to allay fears on the part of plan sponsors investing in mutual fund
shares. First, it may be possible for the sponsor of an employee benefit
plan to appoint the investment adviser in a mutual fund complex to
serve as the plan's investment manager. Under this arrangement, the
adviser who accepts such appointment may invest the plan's assets in
one or more of the mutual funds managed by the adviser. This type of
arrangement is expressly permitted by Prohibited Transaction Exemp-
tion 77-4 in the case of no-load funds' and by Prohibited Transaction
Pensions & Investments, July 19, 1976, at 6, col. 1; Fullerton, Mutual Funds Offer Advantages to
Large and SmallPension Funds, Pensions & Investments, Oct. 10, 1977, at 21, col. 2. It is interest-
ing to note that the concept of market or index funds stemmed from an analysis of investment in
mutual funds. See Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1 AM. B. FOUN-
DATION RESEARCH J. 1 (1976).
60. ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE INVESTMENT WORK GROUP 5 (1976).
61. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
62. See, e.g., Rohrer, Large Plans StillLeery of MutualFunds, Pensions & Investments, June
5, 1978, at 32, col. I.
63. ERISA § 402(c)(3) provides that a named fiduciary of a plan who has control or manage-
ment responsibilities over the plan assets may appoint an "investment manager," a term that is
defined in ERISA § 3(38) as a fiduciary:
(A) who has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of any asset of a plan;
(B) who is (i) registered as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940; (ii) is a bank, as defined in the Act; or (iii) s an insurance company qualified
to perform services described in subparagraph (A) under the laws of more than one
State; and
(C) has acknowledged in writing that he is a fiduciary with respect to the plan.
Id If an investment manager is properly appointed, ERISA § 405 provides that the plan fiduciary
is no longer responsible for individual investment decisions made by the manager. See Hutchin-
son, The Compleat Fiduciary, PENSION WORLD, Apr. 1978, at 46, 48.
64. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
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Exemption 77-9 in the case of funds with sales charges. Some mutual
fund complexes are currently offering this type of service6 6 and others
are reportedly considering initiating such an arrangement. 67
Second, it is possible for the sponsor of an employee benefit plan
to appoint an investment manager who is unrelated to a mutual fund
complex and for the manager then to cause the plan to invest in shares
of one or more mutual funds. This type of arrangement is extremely
common and avoids the entanglements of the prohibited transaction
provisions, since the mutual fund organization does not become a party
in interest or disqualified person with respect to the plan.
Third, it is likely that many employee benefit plans funded with
mutual fund shares will qualify for special treatment under section
404(c) of ERISA, which provides that if each participant in a plan is
permitted to select his own investments from among a broad range, the
employer will not be responsible for the employee's investment deci-
sions.6 8 This section is designed to allow each participant in an indi-
vidual account plan to determine his own investment objectives and
level of risk. While the employer must choose the particular financial
institution that offers a "broad range of investments, ' 69 each partici-
pant specifies the division of his account between such investments.
Since many mutual fund complexes sponsor a large number of mutual
funds with varying investment objectives-ranging from funds invest-
ing in short-term money market instruments to funds investing in
growth stocks-it appears likely that plans that permit participants to
select their own investments from among these various funds will qual-
ify under section 404(c) of ERISA.7°
65. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
66. See Advertisement by The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, PENSION
WORLD, Sept. 1978, at 25.
67. See DeViney, supra note 59.
68. ERISA § 404(c).
In the case of a pension plan which provides for individual accounts and permits a par-
ticipant or beneficiary to exercise control over assets in his account, if a participant or
beneficiary exercises control over the assets in his account (as determined under regula-
tions of the Secretary)--(l) such participant or beneficiary shall not be deemed to be a
fiduciary by reason of such exercise, and (2) no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall
be liable under this part for any loss, or by reason of any breach, which results from such
participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control
Id
For a general discussion, see Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the
Employment [sicI Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARv. L. REv. 960, 974 (1975). See
also Lippman, "Earmarked" Trust Accounts-A Solution to the Small Employer's Fiduciary Re-
sponsibilities, 3 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPILANCE 210 (1977).
69. H.R. CONF. REP. 305-06.
70. The Department of Labor has not yet issued regulations under ERISA § 404(c). On June
15, 1978, the Investment Company Institute requested that such regulations be issued forthwith.
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Fourth, it is doubtful that the sponsor of an employee benefit plan
is in a very different position under ERISA whether he selects an in-
vestment manager or invests in shares of one or more mutual funds. It
is clear that plan sponsors are under a duty to act prudently both in
initially selecting an investment manager and in continuing the use of
the manager.71 This provision has been interpreted to require plan
fiduciaries to monitor continually the performance of investment man-
agers.72 The Department of Labor has issued an interpretative opinion
indicating that plan fiduciaries must follow similar procedures when
investing in mutual fund shares.73 Indeed, it is likely to be far easier
for a plan fiduciary to monitor the performance of a mutual fund than
that of an investment manager. For while the federal securities laws
require mutual funds to provide shareholders with current financial in-
formation in the form of current prospectuses, annual proxy statements
and semi-annual reports, similar requirements are not imposed on in-
See also Oversight Hearings, supra note 2, at 460-61 (statement of Bernard F. Curry on behalf of
the American Bankers Association).
71. See H.R. CONF. REP.,301-02.
Under the substitute, if the plan so provides, a person who is a named fiduciary with
respect to the control or management of plan assets may appoint a qualified investment
manager to manage all or part of the plan assets. (However, in choosing an investment
manager, the named fiduciary must act prudently and in the interests of participants and
beneficiaries, and also must act in this manner in continuing the use of an investment
manager.)
Id
72. ERISA Interpretive Bulletin 75-8 states:
FR-17 Q: What are the ongoing responsibilities of a fiduciary who has appointed
trustees or other fiduciaries with respect to these appointments:
A: At reasonable intervals the performance of trustees and other fiduciaries should
be reviewed by the appointing fiduciary in such manner as may be reasonably expected
to ensure that their performance hfis been in compliance with the terms of the plan and
statutory standards, and satisfies the needs of the plan. No single procedure will be
appropriate in all cases; the procedure adopted may vary in accordance with the nature
of the plan and other facts and circumstances relevant to the choice of the procedure.
29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (1978). In addition, the Report of the Investment Work Group of the ER-
ISA Advisory Council stated: "The... fiduciary should monitor and evaluate the performance
of the . . . investment manager. . . and periodically decide whether or not to retain the...
investment manager." ERISA ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 60, at 6.
73. Dep't of Labor Interpretative Opinion Letter 75-92, at 2-3, Nov. 4, 1975 (on file at Duke
Law Journal office). That Opinion Letter states:
[I]f a plan.., fiduciary is considering whether to invest the entire amount of plan assets,
or any part thereof, in shares of a mutual fund, such. . . fiduciary should examine the
securities and other assets held by the mutual fund before such investment is made,
review the statement as to the fund's investment policy as contained in the fund's pro-
spectus, and periodically review the fund's investments whenever such information is
made available, as long as plan assets are invested in such shares, to determine whether
the investment, when considered together with other plan investments, if any, meets the
diversification requirements....
Such.. . fiduciary should also examine the features of such mutual fund in the
light of the particular objectives of the plan, to determine whether investment of plan
assets in shares of the mutual fund meets the other requirements of section 404(a)(1).
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vestment managers.74 In fact, investment advisers to mutual funds are
attracting pension plan clients for individual management based on the
performance records of their publicly offered mutual funds.75
Finally, the traditional agreement between a plan and an invest-
ment adviser includes certain investment instructions and objectives es-
tablished by the plan fiduciary that the investment adviser is bound to
honor.76 Thus, the plan fiduciary will bear the ultimate reponsibility in
choosing the investment objectives of the plan. Without increasing his
responsibility, the plan fiduciary can seek a mutual fund with concomi-
tant investment objectives. This should not present a difficult task,
since in recent years a plethora of mutual funds have been created that
meet nearly all investment objectives.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of the federal securities laws, particularly the
Investment Company Act of 1940,77 mutual funds have been subject to
extensive substantive regulation on the national level. In enacting ER-
ISA, Congress recognized this system of federal regulation and ex-
empted mutual fund organizations from the Act's provisions relating to
prohibited transactions. Therefore, the mutual fund industry and the
investment dealers that offer mutual fund shares have not encountered
the severe problems that have confronted other types of financial insti-
tutions serving employee benefit plans. At the same time, ERISA's re-
quirements of prudence and diversification have encouraged the use of
mutual funds as a funding medium for a wide variety of employee ben-
efit plans. It appears likely that future pension legislation will serve to
increase further employee benefit plan investment in mutual fund
shares.78
74. For a discussion of the difficulties in obtaining performance information concerning in-
vestment managers, see Schotland, Picking Investment Managers: Eight Observations From One
Who's Been There, Pensions & Investments, Apr. 24, 1978, at 61, col. 1.
75. See Feinberg, supra note 34.
76. If such instructions are contrary to the plan instrument or are clearly imprudent on their
face, the investment adviser may reject the instructions. "In this case, if the trustee properly fol-
lows the instructions of the named fiduciaries, the trustee generally is not to be liable for losses
which arise out of following these instructions." H.R. CONF. REP. 302 (emphasis added). The use
of the word "generally" implies that under some circumstances the trustee would indeed be liable.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1976).
78. Senators Williams and Javits introduced a comprehensive ERISA reform bill in 1978. S.
209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in The ERISA Improvements Act of 1979: Hearings on
S. 209 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Title IV of the bill would establish a new system of "Special Master and Prototype Plans" that
could be sponsored by limited types of financial institutions, including mutual fund organizations.
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